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Abstract
The Mid-Term Review proposals presented by the European Commission in July 2002 and January
2003 correspond no doubt to the most radical CAP reform since the latter was established in the
early 1960’s. This is not because these proposals include firm commitments on market access and
export competition dossiers in the perspective of WTO talks. The proposals are silent on these
points. This is because they finally achieve the shift from product to producer support by replacing
all existing or newly introduced direct income payments, with a few exceptions, by a single
decoupled payment per farm, based on historical references and conditional upon cross-compliance
to environmental, animal welfare as well as food security and quality criteria. In addition, they
expand the scope of rural development instruments to promote food quality, meet higher
standards and foster animal welfare and they increase amounts available for rural development by
transferring funds from the first to the second pillar via the introduction of an EU-wide system of
degression and modulation. This paper discusses these proposals from both an external and
internal point of view. We analyse to what extent the MTR proposals could facilitate the EU
negotiation position in the WTO. From a domestic point of view, these proposals correspond to
appropriate changes in the right direction with however some important qualifications. We analyse
these qualifications. We also discuss to what extent the MTR proposals should be considered as the
ultimate reform of the CAP or as the third step, after 1992 and 1999, in the long-term process
where public intervention would be mainly reserved for correcting market failures, notably the
promotion of positive externalities and public goods as well as the reduction in risk and instability
faced by agricultural producers.
Keywords: Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), decoupling, cross-compliance, modulation, World
Trade Organisation (WTO) 
JEL classification: Q18, Q17, 
Résumé
Les propositions «  Fischler  » de réforme de la Politique agricole commune  : une solution pour
l’avenir ? 
Les propositions de réforme de la Politique agricole commune présentées par la Commission
européenne en juillet 2002 et en janvier 2003 peuvent être considérées comme une révolution.
Non parce qu’elles contiennent des engagements à une plus grande ouverture du marché européen
ou à une diminution des subventions à l’exportation dans la perspective des négociations agricoles
multilatérales du cycle de Doha. Mais parce qu’elles achèvent le mouvement amorcé en 1992 d’un
soutien interne aux produits vers un soutien aux producteurs, via le remplacement des aides
directes actuelles par une paiement unique par exploitation déconnecté des choix de production,
calculé sur une base historique. En outre, le versement de ce paiement serait conditionné au
respect de normes en matière d’environnement, de bien-être animal, de sécurité et de qualité des
produits. Les propositions permettraient également d’augmenter les ressources disponibles pour
financer les mesures dites du deuxième pilier, i.e., les mesures liées à la politique de
développement rural. Cet article analyse les propositions d’un double point de vue, externe et
interne. Sur le premier point, il s’agit notamment d’examiner dans quelle mesure leur adoption
permettrait de faciliter la position de négociation de l’Union européenne à l’Organisation mondiale
du commerce. Sur le deuxième point, nous montrons qu’il s’agit d’un nouveau pas, après ceux de
1992 et de 1999, dans la bonne direction même si certains problèmes ne sont que très
partiellement résolus (par exemple, celui de l’inégale répartition du soutien entre productions,
exploitations, etc.) et même si plusieurs interrogations méritent une analyse quantitative plus
approfondie (par exemple, l’impact de ces propositions sur le prix du foncier, le nombre de
producteurs, l’abandon éventuel de surfaces, etc.).
Mots clef: Politique agricole commune (PAC), découplage, conditionnalité, modulation,
Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC)
Classification JEL: Q18, Q173
 The Fischler’s Proposals for the Common Agricultural Policy: Paving the
Way for the Future?
Hervé GUYOMARD and Katell LE BRIS
1.  Introduction
For the first time in 1992, the European Union (EU) significantly reformed the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) for cereals, oilseeds, protein crops and beef.
1 It is now recognised that the end
product of the 1992 CAP reform was designated to placate the long-standing demands of the
United States (US), supported by other agricultural exporters, mainly the Cairns Croup (CG)
countries, and channelled into the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). Indeed an agricultural agreement in the Uruguay Round (UR) could not have been found
without such a CAP reform. 
The 1992 CAP reform did not cover all agricultural sectors and was clearly far less ambitious
relative to initial European Commission (EC) proposals as regards the reorientation of European
agriculture towards meeting the long-run objectives of increased competitiveness and resource
conservation (CEC, 1991). However it can be considered as a revolution by the magnitude of the
shift from market price support to direct payments borne by taxpayers. At that date, these direct
payments were explicitly designated to compensate for the reduction in price support. For cereals,
oilseeds and protein crops, farmers were entitled to claim an area payment while for beef,
compensation was provided by a complex system of headage payments. 
The Agenda 2000 CAP reform adopted in Berlin in March 1999 represents a deepening (cereals and
beef) and extension (milk) of the 1992 reform through further shifts from price support to direct
payments still linked to production factors (land, livestock and production rights). In addition, it
defines a new framework for the EU rural development policy by bringing a series of measures
together in a single package aiming to offer support to all rural areas. This integrated rural
development policy is clearly presented as the second pillar of the CAP (EC, 1999b).
One achievement of the Agenda 2000 CAP reform that should be not underestimated is the
definition of a new set of objectives for the CAP. In very general terms, the priorities of the Agenda
2000 CAP are to ensure that European agriculture would become more competitive on both the
domestic and world markets, more environmentally sensitive and that farmers livelihoods would be
protected. According to the EC, these priorities would be upheld within the package of measures
adopted in Berlin (EC, 1999). However the encouraging rhetoric towards environment preservation
and rural development does not really translate into very increased budgetary commitments. In
practice, the yearly amount available of about 4.3 billion Euro for financing the second pillar would
not be significantly greater than the amount available in the six-year period 1994-99 for the same
measures (von Urff, 2002).
2 In fact, it appears that the Agenda 2000 CAP reform is mainly
designated to cope with the constraints of the Agricultural Agreement in the Uruguay Round
(AAUR) and the preparation of the Millennium Round (MR) in the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
As a result, the focus on price support cuts in order to increase the price competitiveness of
European products on both the internal and external markets. However the Agenda 2000 reform
makes no proposals to change existing world trade commitments. This led some authors to write
that what is proposed in Agenda 2000 is as far as the EU is prepared to go in WTO negotiation
(Marsh, 1998) and that the reform is based on the premise that AAUR blue box exemptions would
be extended (Tielu and Roberts, 1998).
                                                          
1 The milk quota reform in 1984 was not marginal but concerned only one sector.
2  Most measures financed by the Guarantee Section of the European Agriculture Guidance and
Guarantee Fund (EAAGF) under Agenda 2000 were formerly funded through the Guidance Section
of the EAAGF.  4
In that context, one can wonder at the rashness of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) proposals
presented by the EC in July 2002 and January 2003.
3 These proposals correspond no doubt to the
most radical CAP reform since the latter was established in the early 1960’s. This is not because
the MTR includes firm commitments on market access and export competition dossiers in the
perspective of WTO talks. The MTR is silent on these points.
4 This is because the MTR finally
achieves the shift from product to producer support by replacing all existing or newly introduced
direct income payments, with a few exceptions, by a single decoupled payment per farm, based on
historical references and conditional upon cross-compliance to environmental, animal welfare as
well as food security and quality criteria. In addition, it expands the scope of rural development
instruments to promote food quality, meet higher standards and foster animal welfare, and it
increases amounts available for rural development by transferring funds from the first to the
second pillar via the introduction of an EU-wide system of digressivity and modulation. 
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the MTR proposals,
as laid down in the Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
(CEC, 2002) and Council regulation proposals (CEC, 2003), and replaces them in an historical
perspective. Section 3 discusses these proposals from an external point of view. Our purpose here
is to analyse to what extent the MTR proposals could facilitate the EU negotiation position in the
WTO and the EU enlargement process. Section 4 discusses these proposals from an internal point
of view in a longer run perspective. In a general way, the MTR proposals correspond to appropriate
changes in the right direction with however some important qualifications. We analyse these
qualifications. We also discuss to what extent the MTR proposals should be considered as the
ultimate reform of the CAP or as the third step, after 1992 and 1999, in the long-term process
where public intervention would be mainly reserved for correcting market failures, notably the
promotion of positive externalities and public goods as well as the reduction in risk and instability
faced by agricultural producers.
5 Section 5 concludes and analyses problems, notably in the WTO
negotiation context, that would cause the time report of the reform and/or a political agreement on
a compromise far less ambitious than the MTR proposals as regards decoupling and second pillar
issues.
2.  The MTR Proposals in an Historical Perspective
A brief history of the CAP: From the treaty of Rome to Agenda 2000
The initial objectives of the CAP laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome were (i) to increase
agricultural productivity through the rational development of agriculture towards the optimal
utilisation of the factors of production, (ii) to ensure a fair standard of living for agricultural
producers, (iii) to stabilise agricultural markets, (iv) to guarantee regular supplies of food to
consumers and (v) to ensure reasonable prices of food to consumers (CAP Monitor, 2002, page 1-
1). These objectives were not well defined. Some might even conflict. Initial political decisions were
mainly guided by the productivity increase objective. They were then essentially determined by the
agricultural income support objective and constrained by the budget (Koester and Tangermann,
1990).
The farm income support objective was primarily achieved by two mechanisms, i.e., (i) by applying
variable import levies at the EU frontiers in such a way that third-country imports could not be sold
at a price lower than the desired price (threshold price) and (ii) by buying up the surplus supplies
of products when domestic prices threaten to fall below minimum prices (intervention prices). The
                                                          
3 The January 2003 proposals do not explicitly refer to the MTR of the Agenda 2000 CAP. For
convenience, we however will continue to present them as the January 2003 MTR proposals. We
will use the term “MTR proposals” for elements included in both the July 2002 and January 2003
proposals.    
4 Note however the intention of the EC to “negotiate a change and a simplification of the EU border
protection for wheat and rice which, in current circumstances, functions unsatisfactorily and does
not meet its objectives.” (CEC, 2002). In other words, the current regime fails to provide, at least
in some circumstances, a sufficient protection vis-à-vis imports of some third countries.
5 Risk and instability are not market failures. There is here market failure because risk markets are
incomplete in agriculture.5
system was supplemented by variable export subsidies (export refunds) to compensate the gap
between domestic and world market prices and allow EU farmers to export competitively to the
world market (CAP Monitor, 2002, pages 1-3 and 1-4). With intervention prices set considerably
above world market prices, surplus production resulted and the EU gradually shifted from a net
import to a net export position for many agricultural and food products. This translated by
increases in intervention stocks and budgetary costs, as well as growing distortions of agricultural
markets and international pressures from trading partners for reform.
Although many factors contributed to shape the 1992 CAP reform, it is clear that domestic forces
alone were unable to generate a reform of this extent. In a similar domestic context, the course of
action adopted in 1984 in the dairy sector was the opposite of the route followed in 1992 for
cereals, oilseeds, protein crops and beef (production quotas to maintain high domestic prices in
1984 versus lower support prices compensated by direct aids linked to the area used or the
number of animals in 1992). The international pressure, led by the US and channelled into the
framework of the GATT, was a major factor in 1992 CAP reform design (Guyomard et al., 1994).
The arable land set-aside program supports this view. Its purpose was to reduce excess supply of
cereals with very little attention to environmental concerns. 
The Agenda 2000 CAP reform agreed upon at the Berlin meeting of the Council of Ministers in 1999
has deepened (cereals and beef) and extended (milk) the 1992 reform through further shifts from
price support to direct payments. It also had aimed to develop a coherent rural development policy
officially presented as the second pillar of the CAP.
Policy objectives of the CAP are now as follows: (i) improved competitiveness of EU agriculture, (ii)
guarantee of food safety and food quality, (iii) a fair standard of living for the agricultural
community, (iv) stability of incomes, (v) integration of environmental goals into the CAP and
development of the countryside stewardship role of European farmers, (vi) creation of income and
employment complements or alternatives for farmers and their families, on and off farm, and (vii)
contribution to economic cohesion within the EU. These new objectives are again not well defined
and officially ranked. Some are still potentially contradictory and only two initial objectives are
maintained (a fair standard of living for the agricultural community and stability of incomes). But
even if the EU does not assign explicit weights to the various factors that motive this new reform of
the CAP, it appears that the latter is mainly designed to cope with existing and future WTO
constraints. Hence the focus on price support cuts in order to increase the price competitiveness of
EU agricultural products on both the external and internal markets. One must however note that
immediate decisions are limited to arable crops and the beef sector. The reform of the milk sector
is postponed to 2005/06 and important sectors, sugar in particular, are not even touched.
Table 2.1 presents main agricultural commodity regimes under Agenda 2000. Table 2.2 shows total
support to EU agriculture and by commodity, and their evolution since 1986. These tables reveal a
great heterogeneity between commodities both in terms of instruments used and levels of support.
Table 2.2 also shows that total support to EU agriculture (in million Euro and in percentage) has
not really declined over the ten past years or only very slightly. For the sectors concerned by both
the 1992 and 1999 reforms, part of support has shifted from the market price support category to
direct payments linked to area planted or animal numbers. But even for these sectors, there has
been no significant reduction in support. 
(insert Table 2.1 and Table 2.2)  
The whole Agenda 2000 package also defines the European budgetary framework for the seven-
year period 2000-06. In particular, it fixes CAP expenditure ceilings for this period, on average
40.5 billion Euro per year of which nearly 90 % correspond to market measures and 10 % to rural
development measures (see Annex 1, Table A1.a). About 30.4 billion Euro would be reserved over
the seven-year period 2000-06 for promoting rural development within the Guarantee Section of
the EAGGF. However practically all measures of the new rural development regulation (Rural
Development Regulation (EC) 1257/1999 of 17 May 1999) already existed although in different
administrative settings, and the total amount available for these measures does not really increase
relative to the period 1994-99 (von Urff, 2002). In other words, the growing importance of
environment preservation and rural development issues comes more from the official reference to
them as the second pillar of the CAP than from the increase in budgetary allocations (Swinnen,
2001). 
The importance of another Agenda 2000 regulation, Council Regulation 1259/99 of 17 May 1999,
merits to be underlined. This regulation sets out common rules for direct support schemes under6
the CAP that offer Member States (MS) the options of cross-compliance and modulation. Cross-
compliance allows MS to make direct aid payments conditional on farmers fulfilling nationally
defined environmental management standards and impose penalties, or even withhold payments
entirely, for non-compliance. Modulation allows MS to reduce direct aid payments per farm by up to
20 % according to three criteria, i.e., (i) the labour force of the holding falls shorts of limits set by
the MS, (ii) the overall prosperity of the holding rises above limits set by the MS and (iii) the total
amount of payments granted under support schemes exceeds limits set by the MS. Funds saved
thanks to modulation can be switched to the second pillar for agri-environmental measures, early
retirement schemes, less favoured areas and areas with environmental restrictions and forestry.
Cross-compliance and modulation are voluntary under Agenda 2000. At the moment, cross-
compliance is in play in six MS (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece and the Netherlands)
but does not appear very constraining (von Urff, 2002). After the suspension of the French scheme
in May 2002, the United Kingdom (UK) is currently the only MS which is modulating direct aids, the
flat rate rising from 2.5 % in 2001/02 to 4.5 % in 2005/06 (CAP Monitor, 2002, page 1-6).
6 Cross-
compliance and modulation would be compulsory under the MTR proposals. Furthermore they
would be applied on an EU-wide basis. 
The July 2002 MTR proposals
Does Agenda 2000 go far enough to address the various challenges European agriculture will face
in the near future and in the long term? Many commentators consider that the answer to this
question is no. The EC itself recognises that although much has been achieved since 1992, many
problems have not been solved by Agenda 2000 (CEC, 2002, page 5). 
The EC claims that both proponents and opponents to the Agenda 2000 CAP broadly agree upon
policy objectives established in Berlin in 1999 and enhanced in the European Summit of Göteborg
in 2001. These objectives are as follows: (i) a competitive agricultural sector, (ii) production
methods that support environmentally friendly, quality products that the public wants, (iii) a fair
standard of living and income stability for the agricultural community, (iv) diversity in forms of
agriculture, maintaining visual amenities and supporting rural communities, (v) simplicity in
agricultural policy and the sharing of responsibilities among Commission and Member States, and
(vi) justification of support through the provision of services that the public expects farmers to
provide. It recognises that the current CAP is not able to achieve these objectives and hence
proposes a set of substantial changes to simultaneously enhance the competitiveness of EU
agriculture, promote a market oriented, sustainable EU agriculture and strengthen rural
development. 
On the price support side of things and as far as cereals are concerned, the MTR objective is to
complete the reform process by implementing the further 5 % cut in the cereal intervention price
envisaged by Agenda 2000. It proposes to end intervention for rye, to reduce specific aids for
durum wheat and to cut the intervention price for rice by 50 %, three products for which market
imbalances are likely to be severe in the near future without reform. No changes are envisaged for
beef and milk beyond what has already been agreed in Berlin at Agenda 2000. However, in the
case of milk, the EC presents potential consequences of four scenarios (maintaining the status quo
until 2015, increasing quotas and reducing intervention prices, reducing quotas for the domestic
market with unlimited volumes for export markets, and abolishing the quota system from 2008 and
cutting intervention prices). In addition, the EC underlines the fact that there are a series of sectors
where reform proposals have still to be submitted in 2003 (sugar, tobacco, olive oil and possibly
wine as well as fruit and vegetables). In a general way, proposed and future reforms of Common
Market Organisations (CMOs) are guided by one long-run objective, i.e., to use the public
intervention mechanism as a safety net measure only and no more as an income support
instrument as it was the case before, at least implicitly. Decoupling income support direct aids (see
below) and considering intervention as a safety net only would allow EU agricultural producers to
respond more importantly to market signals while protecting them from extreme price fluctuations. 
The four key words of the July 2002 MTR proposals are decoupling, cross-compliance, dynamic
modulation and rural development. Table 2.3 presents these four points and compares them with
corresponding Agenda 2000 provisions.
                                                          
6 In France, smaller producers were not subject to modulation.  7
(insert Table 2.3) 
A decoupled whole-farm payment based on historical references and backed by cross-
compliance requirements. The main innovation of the July 2002 MTR proposals is to replace
existing or newly introduced pillar one direct aids by a single decoupled direct payment per farm,
based on historical references and conditional on the respect of statutory environmental, food
safety and animal welfare standards as well as occupational safety requirements for farmers. The
focus of these cross-compliance requirements is on supporting the enforcement of good farming
practices defined as encompassing mandatory European standards. The MTR includes the
replacement of the current rotational set-aside on arable land by a long-term (10 years) non-
rotational set-aside, officially for both supply control and environmental objectives. This long-term
set-aside is also an element of cross-compliance requirements.
7 In addition, it introduces a system
of mandatory farm auditing as part of cross-compliance requirements for producers receiving more
than 5000 Euro per year in direct payments. 
The EC alleges that the whole-farm payment would be decoupled (at least in theory and/or in
terms of URAA box classification) because production would not be required and producers would
have almost complete farming flexibility.
8 It would achieve the shift from product to producer
support. It would thus greatly increase the market orientation of EU agriculture allowing farmers to
fully benefit from market opportunities in supplying the products that consumers want.
9 In
addition, it would represent a major simplification and contribute to environmental integration by
removing production specific incentives that potentially damage the environment. 
Strengthening rural development by transferring funds from the first to the second pillar
thanks to dynamic modulation. The second major innovation of the July 2002 MTR proposals is
the so-called dynamic modulation by which all direct payments would be reduced by 3 % per year
up to the maximum of 20 % agreed in Agenda 2000 (digressivity mechanism). The smallest farms
would be exempt from payment cuts (franchise mechanism) while ceilings would cap direct aids for
largest farms (capping mechanism).
10 Funds saved through the dynamic modulation would be
switched from the first to the second pillar. The latter would be consolidated and strengthened, first
by defining new accompanying measures (introduction of two new chapters related to food quality
issues and farmers’ adaptation to mandatory standards), second by widening the scope of current
rural development measures, notably the agri-environment chapter (inclusion of animal welfare
payments and increasing of the co-financing rate). The MTR proposals include temporary,
digressive and targeted direct aids to assist farmers in meeting standards and permanent, non-
digressive and targeted direct aids to support farmers in providing public goods and positive
externalities beyond mandatory requirements. 
Table 2.4 summarises the main elements of the July 2002 MTR proposals linking policy objectives
and solutions proposed to achieve them.
(insert Table 2.4)
The January 2003 MTR proposals 
One conclusion of the Brussels Summit in October 2002 was to set a budget ceiling on pillar one
agricultural expenditure for the 2007-13 period. Corresponding expenditure shall be kept below the
                                                          
7 Current provisions allowing production of non-food crops, including energy crops, on set-aside
land would be eliminated. Support for energy crops would be provided by a specific payment of 45
Euro par hectare. The stated aim of these “carbon credits” is to favour carbon dioxide substitution.   
8 Including haying and grazing, but excluding fruit and legumes.
9 High support prices for sugar, milk and beef notably would however continue to provide powerful
production incentives.
10 After the application of both the digressivity and franchise, the maximum of direct payments
which could be made to a producer would be 300 000 Euro. The new US farm bill also includes a
cap of 360 000 Dollar on the amount an individual farmer can receive.8
2006 figure in nominal terms, increased by 1 % per year. At the Copenhagen Summit in December
2002, heads of States and Governments from the EU-15 and ten candidate countries reached
agreement on a formula for enlarging the EU to encompass ten new MS from 2004. The outcomes
of the Copenhagen Summit can be summarised as follows, as far as agriculture is concerned: (i) a
rural development package for the ten candidate countries, broadened in scope and in comparison
to the funds available for the existing MS, financially more important (5.1 billion Euro for the three
years 2004-06 and measures co-financed by the EU at an increased rate of 80 % at maximum), (ii)
a special measure to make semi-subsistence farms viable, (iii) a gradual introduction of direct
payments over a transition period of ten years, from 25 % in 2004 to 100 % in 2013, (iv) the
possibility to top up direct payments
11, (v) a simplified implementation of direct payments allowing
new MS to grant them in the form of a decoupled area aid applied to the whole agricultural area,
and (v) the setting of production quotas, premium rights, etc. on the basis of the most recent
historical periods for which data are available (EC, 2002c). Whether or not this agreement will
comply with budgetary guidelines adopted at the Brussels Summit two months before remains to
be seen. Many commentators consider that it will be very difficult to fit additional expenditure into
the Brussels financial framework without further CAP reforms (see, for example, Swinnen, 2003).
12
What is certain is that the budget constraint translates in immediate and unfortunate consequences
for the MTR proposals as a large part of funds saved thanks to digressivity and modulation is now
reserved to cover “future financing needs”, i.e., more simply, to finance additional reforms in some
sectors (dairy, sugar, etc.).  
Although the general philosophy of the July 2002 and January 2003 MTR proposals is the same, the
EC has made a number of significant changes relative to its earlier proposals. The two most
important changes are related to the reform of the dairy policy and to the dynamic modulation
mechanism. 
For arable crops and beef, market measure changes are minor: in the case of durum wheat,
replacement of the quality top-up premium of 15 Euro per ton by a premium of 40 Euro per
hectare in traditional production areas, within the Maximum Guaranteed Area (MGA) limit, provided
certain quantities of seed are used from varieties selected for their quality for semolina and pasta
production; in the case of protein crops, establishment of a MGA of 1.4 million hectares; in the
case of starch potatoes, suppression of the minimum price and introduction of a direct aid of
110,54 Euro per ton of starch, 50 % of this aid being granted as a specific payment. Dairy quotas
would be maintained at least until 2014/15. In this sector the EC proposes to advance the Agenda
2000 reform by one year to cover the three years 2004 to 2006, with asymmetric intervention
price cuts of 3.5 % per year for Skimmed Milk Powder (SMP) and 7.5 % per year for butter. These
price reductions would continue in 2007 and 2008, with increases of 1 % per year in quotas and
adapted increases in compensatory payments. Direct payments would be decoupled from 2004 and
included in the single whole-farm payment. Intervention purchases of butter would be more severe
with a buying-in by tenders above 30 000 tons. 
The July 2002 and January 2003 MTR proposals can be characterised by the same key words, i.e.,
decoupling, cross-compliance, digressivity and modulation, and rural development. However there
are a number of changes that merit to be underlined (for a synthetic presentation of these
changes, see Table 2.3). 
The decoupled whole-farm payment remains central to the plans. It would be based on direct aids
received in the three reference years 2000, 2001 and 2002. It would be broken down into payment
entitlements per hectare. These entitlements would be calculated at the farm level by dividing the
reference amount by the average number of all hectares which gave right to direct payments in the
reference years. Total amounts of decoupled aid would be capped at a country level by the setting
of national ceilings.
13 Entitlements could be transferred between farmers within the same MS or
within a region of a MS. They could be transferred by sale with or without land. They could also be
transferred by lease but in that case only if the transfer of an equivalent number of eligible
                                                          
11 More precisely, a MS will have the possibility to complement direct aids by 30 %, financed by its
rural development funds and national funds up to 55 % in 2004, 60 % in 2005 and 65 % in 2007.
From 2007, the financing will be entirely from national funds.  
12 Swinnen (2003) considers that numbers used by the EC correspond to “optimistic” assumptions.
Furthermore, they do not take into account for the costs of Bulgaria and Romania joining,
theoretically from 2007. 
13 These national ceilings « replace » the individual ceiling of 300 000 Euro of earlier proposals. 9
hectares accompanies them. In addition, to prevent aid entitlement trade by speculators, the single
payment would be tied to the area of land held annually. Farmers would be required to maintain
land in good agronomic condition, but not necessarily to produce. They would be allowed to use
hectares for any purpose except permanent crops (fruit and vegetables are no longer excluded).
The compulsory cross-compliance system would establish sanctions which would take the form of a
partial or entire reduction of the decoupled single farm payment and coupled specific direct
payments in case of non-respect of obligations arising from about forty legislative acts applying
directly at the farm level, good farming practices and maintaining permanent pasture. Under the
new proposals, the farm audit would be obligatory for farms receiving more than 15 000 Euro in
direct aids (the original threshold was 5 000 Euro) or having an annual turnover greater than 100
000 Euro.
More important changes concern the dynamic modulation mechanism. Table 2.5 presents the new
proposals in that domain. Digressivity (from now called degression in EC documents) and
modulation would not start before 2006 (original start date was 2004). In 2006, all direct
payments would be reduced by 1 %, farmers receiving less than 5 000 Euro per year in direct aids
being exempt. From 2007, reduction rates would be less important for a farmer who receives
between 5 000 and 50 000 Euro per year in direct aids than for a producer who receives more than
50 000 Euro per year in direct aids. For the former, the reduction rate would progressively increase
from 1 % in 2006 to 12.5 % in 2012. For the latter, it would increase until 19 % in 2012. Funds
saved thanks to digression and modulation would be used, for part to finance pillar two measures,
for part to finance new reforms of Common Market Organisations (CMOs). As a result, by the year
2012 less than 50 % of funds saved thanks to degression and modulation would be transferred to
the second pillar of the CAP (see section 4). This is in sharp contrast with earlier proposals where
all funds saved thanks to dynamic modulation were dedicated for rural development spending. 
 
(insert Table 2.5)
3.  Analysis from an International Perspective
The MTR proposals and the WTO negotiations
The AAUR was concluded in 1994 and WTO member countries had until 2000/01 to implement the
agreement. Although the concrete consequences of the AAUR on world agriculture and agricultural
support worldwide have been modest since six years, its significance should not be
underestimated. Of major significance is the move away from open-ended price support in
agriculture and the placement of agriculture on the agenda of current multilateral negotiations, the
so-called MR. Of equal significance is the definition of a negotiation framework in three main areas
(market access, export competition and domestic support) to deal with agricultural issues. In other
words, the Uruguay Round (UR) has resulted, if not in much effective agricultural liberalisation, at
least in a framework to build on in the next round of agricultural negotiations (Swinnen, 2001). 
WTO member countries agreed to re-initiate agricultural negotiations for continuing the reform
process one year before the end of the implementation period of the AAUR, i.e., by the end of
1999.
14 These preliminary talks have now been incorporated into the broader negotiating agenda
set at the 2001 Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. According to Paragraph 13 of the Ministerial
Declaration adopted on 14 November 2001, agricultural negotiations aim at substantial
improvements in market access, reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export
subsidies and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. Paragraph 13 explicitly
recognises that special and differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part
of all elements of the agricultural negotiations and non-trade concerns shall be taken into account.
According to Paragraph 14, modalities for the further commitments on the agricultural dossier shall
be established no later than 31 March 2003 and the agricultural negotiations shall be concluded as
part and as the date of conclusion of the negotiating agenda as a whole, i.e., no later than 1
January 2005 (WTO, 2001).
                                                          
14 Recognising that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and
protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process, Article 20 of the AAUR included a
commitment to engage in a new round of multilateral agricultural negotiations before the end of
1999. 10
The provisions of the AAUR and their effects on world agriculture since 1994 are well documented
in the literature. In a general way, quantitative effects were very modest (Tangermann, 2001).
This is also the case for the EU (Anania, 2002). The problem is then to analyse to what extent the
MTR proposals would allow the EU to comply with future WTO commitments even it is difficult, of
course, to predict what could be precisely these commitments. More generally, it is also to analyse
to what extent the MTR proposals would allow the EU to adopt an offensive attitude in the MR in
pressing for some issues it wants to include and protect like international recognition of food safety
criteria, animal welfare standards or country of origin labelling. At this stage, one will simply note
that the time report of the MTR reform, i.e., the time report of the decision of its implementation
aggravated by uncertainties surrounding the final form it would take, will certainly handicap the EU
negotiators at the WTO.
The MTR proposals do not include commitments to reform EU agricultural trade policies.
The market access elements of the AAUR focused on converting non-tariff border measures to
tariffs, binding all tariffs and reducing them by 36 % on average over six years from a 1986-88
base, with a minimum reduction of 15 % per tariff line, as well as ensuring the provision of
minimum access opportunities and maintenance of current access levels essentially through Tariff-
Rate Quotas (TRQs).
15 In the EU, tarrification translated by the conversion of variable import levies
into fixed tariffs. In a general way, market access commitments were not a problem for the EU
over the six-year implementation period of the agreement.
16 Fixed tariffs were calculated by taking
the average difference between the domestic intervention price and the world Fob (Free on board)
price, plus 10 % and monthly increments, over the base period 1986-88. This allowed the EU to set
initial tariffs at sufficiently high levels so that imports above minimum and current access levels are
still unlikely to occur in the next years if tariffs are not further significantly reduced in the MR (at
least for a majority of agricultural commodities). In addition, there is considerable water in the
tariffs for some products and the EU, as many other developed countries, is in position to accept
significant reductions in bound rates before these cuts translate in reductions in applied rates
(AAUR commitments were to reduce bound rates, not actual applied rates). In the same way,
impacts of TRQs on EU agricultural imports were generally small over the implementation period of
the agreement. This is not surprising notably because existing concessions were considered as part
of access commitments (Huan-Niemi and Niemi, 2001). 
In the framework of MR talks, several countries have adopted an aggressive approach on the
market access dossier calling for deep cuts in tariffs, reduction in tariff complexity and dispersion
as well as simplification and transparency in TRQ administration in order to reduce, if possible
eliminate, their underfill (IATRC, 2001). The EU has adopted a much more conservative attitude
since the EC proposes to duplicate AAUR commitments by offering an overall average tariff
reduction of 36 %, with a minimum reduction per tariff line of 15 %. The EC proposal presented in
December 2002 also contains specific provisions for developing countries, i.e., as far as market
access is concerned, no less than 50 % of developed countries’ agricultural imports from
developing countries at zero duty, duty-free and quota-free access for all imports from Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) into developed and advanced developing countries as well as a
significant reduction of tariff escalation on products of particular interest to developing countries by
reducing the level of tariff protection, both ad valorem and specific (EC, 2002a). 
How to explain the very prudent strategy of the EC on the market access dossier, notably on tariff
and TRQ reform? Simply because the sustainability of many domestic policies and more generally
of both the Agenda 2000 and MTR CAP requires maintenance of sufficient import protection. In
other words, the EU needs to preserve as much of the existing import protection system as
possible to meet Agenda 2000 and MTR policy objectives within the budgetary framework agreed in
Berlin in 1999 and in Brussels in 2002. This is notably the case for sectors where income support is
still mainly achieved by market price support measures. Huan-Niemi and Niemi (2001) show that
the EU would be able to maintain a comfortable border protection for most agricultural
commodities, with the noticeable exception of butter, in a scenario where European tariffs will be
                                                          
15 For developing countries, the tariff reduction was 24 % over ten years. 
16  This is true for a large majority of countries. Despite the reductions agreed in the UR,
agricultural tariffs currently average over 64 % compared with less than 4 % for non agricultural
commodities (Gibson et al., 2001). 11
further reduced along the same lines as those used in the AAUR.
17 However their calculations
suggest that the margin of protection could become small by the end of the decade if tariff peaks
were reduced by higher percentages than 36 %, in particular if the Euro is strong vis-à-vis the US
Dollar and if world prices are low. This explains why the EU is not willing to accept a tariff reduction
formula that would cut high tariffs more than low tariffs.
18 These high tariffs generally apply to
sensitive markets where domestic prices are still significantly higher than those prevailing on the
world market. Dairy products are an obvious case in point. Interestingly enough, one would note
that the Doha Ministerial Declaration explicitly mentions the elimination of tariff peaks in the
industrial sector but does not address this issue in the case of agriculture (Rude and Meilke, 2002).
In a similar way, expanded TRQs open to all exporters could constitute a serious concern for the EU
in particular, but not only, for markets where domestic prices are much higher than world prices.
At this stage, one would note that the EC does propose expanding TRQs and eliminating in-quota
duties for developing countries, but not for developed countries. In other words, the EC does not
make concrete offers to allow developed countries to increase their in-quota exports to the
European market.  
The EC rightfully points out that the EU is still today the world’s largest importer of agricultural
goods (60 billion Dollar in 2001), the world’s largest importer of farm products from developing
countries (38 billion Dollar in 2001 compared with 22 billion Dollar for the US, 12 for Japan, 2 for
Canada and less than 1 for Australia) and the world’s largest importer of agricultural products from
LDCs (EC, 2002b). However, for several products, import penetration ratios and/or import shares
decreased in the EU in the post-AAUR period as compared to the pre-AAUR 1990-94 or 1986-89
periods. Table 3.1 illustrates this point. 
(insert Table 3.1)  
The export competition elements of the AAUR focused on direct export subsidies which were, for
the first time, subject to disciplines. Developed countries agreed to reduce subsidised export
volumes by 21 % and value by 36 % over the six-year period 1995-2000 from base period 1986-
90 levels. It is clear that the main constraint the AAUR imposed on EU agriculture and agricultural
policy since 1994 lied in export commitments. According to Anania (2002), the AAUR had a limiting
effect on EU subsidised exports in at least one of the five year 1995-1999 for rice, olive oil, wine,
fresh fruit and vegetables, beef, poultry meat, cheese and other milk products. In several cases
including wine, fresh fruit and vegetables, poultry meat and cheese, the EU was however able to
increase non-subsidised exports when the constraint on the volume of subsidised exports became
binding. Anania (2002) adds that if Agenda 2000 was not implemented, the EU would also very
likely have had to face binding constraints from 2001 on wheat and coarse grains. More important
perhaps than immediate effects of export commitments on exported volumes, with and without
subsidies, is their impact on CAP design since 1994. It is clear that this consideration was largely
influential in shaping the EC proposals for CAP reform in both Agenda 2000 and the MTR. 
In the area of export competition, the MR negotiations have presently covered export subsidies,
export credits, food aid and export state trading enterprises (WTO, 2002). A central issue is
whether export subsidies should be phased out or whether the negotiators should only seek further
reduction commitments (Rude and Meilke, 2002). The CG and the US are in favour of elimination.
The EU does not seem ready to accept the immediate, i.e., during the implementation period of the
                                                          
17 Eight products are analysed (butter, skim milk powder, beef, pig meat, poultry meat, wheat,
barley and corn). Two scenarios are considered. The first scenario assumes that the Euro is strong
vis-à-vis the US Dollar (1 Euro for 1.20 US Dollar). The second scenario assumes that the Euro is
weak vis-à-vis the US Dollar (1 Euro for 0.80 Dollar).   
18 Such as the so-called Swiss formula proposed by the CG or the US proposal for a straightforward
reduction in tariff peaks. Agra Europe reports, unfortunately without formal demonstration except
for butter, that application of either the CG or US proposal for tariff reduction “would have a
devastating effect on the current highly effective livestock import tariffs” adding that in the case of
dairy products, “ the application of the Swiss formula could result in a level of tariff at the end of
the five years which would reduce the protection level to below the domestic support price even
after the deduction of the 15 % cut in the EU milk target price from 2005.” (Agra Europe, 20
September 2002).   12
MR agreement, elimination of direct export subsidies.
19 It addition, it rightfully points out that
export commitments should include all forms of promoting exports because they can be as trade
distorting as direct export subsidies. In practice, the EC “proposes an average substantial cut in the
volume of export subsidies and an average 45 % cut in the level of budgetary outlays on the
condition that all forms of export subsidisation are treated on an equal footing.” (EC, 2002a).
Interestingly enough, one would note that the EC proposal includes a specific reduction target for
budgetary outlays, but not for subsidised export volumes. This is not surprising because further
export subsidy quantity commitments are likely to be binding more quickly and more severely than
export subsidy budgetary commitments (Huan-Niemi and Niemi, 2001). 
The MTR proposals would allow the EU to adopt an offensive stance on the domestic
support dossier, at least a less defensive attitude. Inclusion of commitments on domestic
support in the AAUR was an important breakdown since it explicitly recognised that domestic
policies do link to international trade. In practice, the agreement differentiated domestic support
policies according to their perceived abilities to impact on production and disrupt trade flows.
Green box policies correspond to domestic farm programs that are deemed to be minimally trade
distorting and hence are exempted from reduction commitments and expenditure limits. Eleven
types of green box policies are distinguished and for each type, specific guidelines define the
eligibility of the program for the green box.
20 One category refers to decoupled income support
which is defined by three main requirements, i.e., (i) clearly defined eligibility criteria for a fixed
base period, (ii) payments not related to the volume of production, prices or factors of production
in any year after the base period and (iii) no requirement to produce to receive payments. Blue box
policies correspond to direct payments under production-limiting programs and are also excluded
from reduction commitments. To be included in the blue box, direct payments must be based on
fixed area and yields, or made on 85 % or less of the base level of production or in the case of
livestock payments, made on a fixed number of head. The US target price - deficiency payment in
place before 1996 was a blue box program. The arable area and livestock payments currently in
place in the EU are blue box programs. Although blue box payments can potentially distort trade,
they are allowed under the premise that supply limit criteria partially offset the subsidies’
incentives to over produce and disrupt trade (Burfisher, 2001). Amber box policies are defined by
default. They correspond to all the measures that are not classified as green or blue. The
agreement provides for a 20 % reduction of countries’ aggregate levels of amber domestic support
during the six-year implementation period from an agreed base corresponding to the average
1986-88.
21 This commitment applies to the whole of the agricultural sector rather than being for
individual products. In addition, within the amber box, some programs can be exempted from
reductions if their AMS amounts are considered too small to count. These exemptions are referred
to as de minimis exemptions. 
In practice, the domestic support discipline proved the least binding AAUR constraint as all
countries fulfilled their commitments and for many of them, by a large margin (OECD, 2002). This
is also the case for the EU. Table 3.2 clearly shows that the EU has so far had no difficulty meeting
its AMS obligation. More interestingly, it also indicates that the EU would have stayed within the
limits imposed by the agreement even without the blue box provisions. In that case, the margin
would however have been low by the end of the 1990s (about 2 billion Euro in 1999/00). Huan-
Niemi and Niemi (2001) show that the EU would not face any problems in staying within its AMS
commitments even if amber box measures were further reduced by 20 % over the six-year period
2004/05-2009/10. This is the case notably because full implementation of Agenda 2000 (from
2002) will switch support from the amber to the blue box.
22  
                                                          
19 To quote Commissioners Lamy and Fischler, the Doha Ministerial Declaration fits out mandate on
export competition because it “clarifies beyond doubt that there is no commitment now to
negotiate the elimination of [direct] export subsidies.” (EC, 2001).
20 The eleven categories are 1/ general services, 2/ public stockholding for food security purposes,
3/ domestic food aid, 4/ decoupled income support, 5/ government financial participation in income
insurance and income safety net programs, 6/ disaster payments, 7/ producer retirement schemes,
8/ resource retirement schemes, 9/ investment aids, 10/ environmental payments and 11/ regional
assistance. For more details, see, for example, Blandford (2001) or Hart and Babcock (2002).   
21 AMS reduction commitments are 13.3 % for developing countries.  
22 According to Anania (2002), this shift would decrease the EU AMS by about 9 billion Euro. 13
Blue box programmes that were exempt from cuts in domestic support in the AAUR are recognised
as less market distorting than the same levels of open-ended price support, and even coupled
production support without supply limiting arrangements. Nevertheless many countries consider
that blue box payments are yet still too distorting and push for the elimination of the blue box
exception in the MR. This blue box exception is not really used by WTO member countries, except
the EU. Without shifting a large part of domestic support from the blue to the green box, the EU
will be constrained to ask for maintenance of the blue box for its direct compensatory payments. In
other words, shifting domestic support from the blue to the green box with decoupling would allow
the EU to focus on its main weakness, i.e., a lower cost and price competitiveness relative to many
other agricultural exporters. Without decoupling, it is likely that other WTO countries would try to
use the blue box leverage to obtain more severe commitments on market access and/or export
competition dossiers. Furthermore the AAUR definition of the green box is perhaps not unchanging,
notably because many countries consider that some green box measures are in fact not minimally
trade distorting (Roberts, 2003). In that context, it is clear that life will be easier for the EU with
the MTR CAP as adoption of the latter would allow European negotiators to concentrate their efforts
on market access issues as well as on the green box definition (more precisely, on a sufficiently
large definition of the green box to include the decoupled whole-farm MTR payment and pillar two
measures). 
(insert Table 3.2)
The MTR proposals and the EU enlargement process to Central and Eastern European
countries
It is no more time to ask whether the MTR proposals could have facilitated accession negotiations
of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU. These negotiations were concluded at the
European Council in Copenhagen on 12 and 13 December 2002. Ten new countries will join the EU
on 1 May 2004. The Copenhagen Council also confirmed the objective of welcoming Bulgaria and
Romania as EU members in 2007. In practice, the main question is to know whether the 2007-13
agricultural budget guideline on pillar one measures will be sufficient to face additional costs
implied by market support measures and direct aids in the new MS. Even if official figures
presented by the EC suggest that pillar one measures would (could) remain below the ceiling,
many observers consider that event as unlikely. The enlargement agreement on direct aids would
quickly put pressure on the pillar one ceiling, notably after 2008 when both Bulgaria and Romania
will have join. At this stage, it is worthwhile to note that there is no equivalent ceiling for pillar two
expenditure. As a result, the MTR proposals could (should) alleviate the budgetary constraint by
transferring funds from the first to the second pillar. In a longer-term perspective, one can
nevertheless regret that both the enlargement agreement and the January 2003 MTR proposals
send what can be considered as wrong signals. The first wrong signal is to allow accession
candidate countries to complement direct aids by funds of the second pillar.
23 The second wrong
signal is that the January 2003 MTR proposals reduce total amounts transferred from the first to
the second pillar by reserving a large part of resources saved thanks to degression and modulation
to finance future reforms of some Common Market Organisations (CMOs). 
4.  Analysis from a Domestic Perspective
The MTR proposals viewed as an application of the targeting principle
Any discussion on the future of European direct aids raises first the question of policy objectives
pursued through their use (Swinnen, 2001). In 1992, direct payments could largely be considered
as compensations for support and market price declines. At that date, the Council of the European
Communities referred explicitly to the need to compensate the loss of income caused by the
                                                          
23 Corresponding funds are however not very important and the possibility to use second pillar
resources to complement pillar one direct aids applies only for the three years 2004, 2005 et 2006.
Furthermore adoption of the MTR proposals would allow to reduce the length of the transition
period for a full application of direct aids in Central and Eastern European Countries, from 10 to 7
years.     14
reduction in institutional prices. This is far less evident today as changes in terminology suggest
(Beard and Swinbank, 2001).
24 The MTR document does not contain the term of compensatory
payments. It however explicitly recognises the need of direct aids to ensure a fair standard of living
and stability of income for the agricultural community (CEC, 2002, page 7). In addition to income
support and stability objectives, direct aids can also be granted to reward farmers for specific
activities, notably for providing non-commodity outputs which very often are public goods and/or
amenities and thus may require public intervention. Measures of the second pillar can partially be
analysed using this reading grid. 
One can interpret the MTR proposals on the decoupling of direct aids and the fund switching from
the first to the second pillar as an application of the targeting principle which requires that “when
distortions have to be introduced in the economy, because the values of certain variables have to
be constrained, the optimal (or least-cost) method of doing this is to choose that policy
intervention that creates the distortion affecting directly the constrained variable.” (Bhagwati,
1971). The maintenance of agricultural incomes remains a major objective of the MTR CAP. More
than the validity of the policy objective in itself, the question is whether or not the single decoupled
payment per farm is an efficient means of achieving it. In that context, one can wonder about the
interpretation of cross-compliance requirements, including the long-term set-aside. Analysis will
lead us to formulate a proposal for a domestic support policy which explicitly recognises that
European farmers have different functions that require specific forms of public intervention and
which should comply with current and future WTO commitments.  
The single decoupled direct aid per farm: Some advantages
All the different ways governments use to support farmers’ incomes can potentially distort trade
and reduce economic welfare. But some income support policies can be less trade distorting and/or
more efficient than others. It is now well admitted, at least among a majority of agricultural
economists, that trade policies and market price support policies are inappropriate devices for
supporting agricultural incomes in so far as there exist other types of income support policies that
are simultaneously less distorting and more efficient. In a simplified word without market failure,
the income support objective will certainly be best achieved through a decoupled direct payment
from taxpayers to producers. In that context, the AAUR defines seven criteria that an income
support measure shall meet to be classified as a decoupled income support instrument. In practice,
these seven conditions can be interpreted as an attempt to define a concrete instrument that
duplicates the effects, more precisely the absence of effects, of lump-sum transfers of the theory.
In other words, a prime reason for decoupling direct payments to producers is to simultaneously
reduce trade distortion effects, making them more acceptable on the international scene (cf.
supra), and increase transfer efficiency.
25 
The MTR proposals on decoupling should increase the market orientation of European agriculture
notably because producers would have almost full farming flexibility. They should allow farmers to
better respond to market demands by removing current incentives to produce for direct subsidies.
They also should reduce administrative costs for both farmers and public administrations. Of
course, the more sectors that are covered by the program, the greater these market and
administrative benefits. Important commodities are however still excluded (sugar) or only partially
reformed (milk). The political and courageous rhetoric towards the integration of a maximum
number of sectors into the scheme is likely to come up against the budgetary constraint problem. 
                                                          
24 Beard and Swinbank (2001) compare the terms used in 1992 (MacSharry reform) and 1999
(Agenda 2000 reform). 
25 This does not mean that a direct payment that is classified as decoupled according to the AAUR
has no effect on production and trade. In particular, any income support policy induces wealth and
insurance effects causing production to increase and distorting trade (Hennessy, 1998). These
wealth and insurance effects add to coupling effects when support is provided through a
production-linked instrument. The policy issue is whether or not orders of magnitude of wealth and
insurance effects differ when support is provided through a decoupled program versus a coupled
mechanism (for a same level of support). Although there is a lack of theoretical and empirical
evidence, it is generally admitted that decoupled government payments that would replace the
same average levels of coupled support are likely to result in lower trade distortion effects (ABARE,
1999).    15
The above mentioned advantages are well known and explain why the MTR proposals on
decoupling, degression and modulation as well as second pillar measures have been generally well
received by a majority of agricultural economists. This does not mean that the MTR proposals do
not present some drawbacks. Some of them are summarised in Table 4.1 for the main innovation
of the proposals, i.e., the whole-farm decoupled direct aid. They are discussed in the following
sections of the paper. 
(insert Table 4.1)
A problem only very partially addressed: The uneven distribution of support
The MTR proposals do not really address the equity problem across countries and regions as well as
across farmers. Since the direct payment per farm would be based on historical references, it
should continue to benefit proportionally more to North-European countries and largest farms even
when the degression rate will be maximum. After all, a fund switching of 20 % (July 2002
proposals) or much lower than 20 % (January 2003 proposals) from the first to the second pillar
means that the bulk of budgetary support will still be provided through a mechanism that will
continue to favour largest farms which were previously specialised in specific products. The
degression and modulation mechanism would however modify the uneven distribution of current
direct aids. In practice, the redistributive effects of the MTR proposals will derive from two sources,
the way pillar one direct aids will be reduced and the way funds saved in this way will be allocated
on pillar two measures and agricultural sectors not yet reformed.
26
Let us first consider the dynamic modulation mechanism of the July 2002 proposals. Figures show
that the capping of pillar one direct aids would have mainly hurt larger-scale farms of Eastern
Germany (Kleinhanss, 2002). Of the 204 million Euro that would have been withheld the first year
of application (i.e., with a digressivity rate of 3 %) through the capping mechanism, 182 million
Euro (89 %) would have been withdrawn from eastern Germany and of the 100 million Euro that
would have been be withheld the last year of application (i.e., with a digressivity rate of 20 %), 92
million Euro (92 %) would have been withdrawn from eastern Germany. The impact of capping on
other countries would have been null or negligible (Table 4.2). Even if the savings from capping
would have been redistributed according to the amount capped in each Member State (MS), this
very uneven impact of the capping mechanism casts serious doubts on both its economic and
political opportunity. It is unlikely that a political priority is to hurt more severely farms of Eastern
Germany relative to, for example, largest farms in Italy or the UK. The digressivity of pillar one
direct aids, weighted by the franchise mechanism by which smallest farms would be exempt, would
have allowed to transfer funds from the first to the second pillar for an amount equal to 490 million
Euro the first year of application (digressivity rate of 3 %) and 3.263 billion Euro the last year of
application (digressivity rate of 20 %). Countries would have been be unequally affected (Table
4.2). This uneven impact of the digressivity and franchise mechanisms simply reflects the fact that
current direct aids are themselves unequally distributed across commodities and countries (Table
4.3), as well as between farms.
27 
(insert Table 4.2 and Table 4.3)
The Agenda 2000 reform saw the first consolidation of rural development and agri-environmental
policies into a single framework. Rural Development Regulation (EC) 1257/1999 of 17 May 1999
sets out the measures that may taken by each MS to promote rural development and protect
environment. It includes seven chapters for which the EU can provide support through the EAGGF
(for more details, see Annex 1). In practice, under Agenda 2000, the growing importance of rural
development comes more from the official reference to the need of a second pillar for the CAP than
                                                          
26 The silent of the MTR proposals about the “optimal” repartition of funds between the first and the
second pillar makes life easier for the EC as it clearly allows the latter to sell the reform to
established farmers on the premise that the proposed sharing could be permanent, at least be
maintained on a “sufficient” period of time.  
27 According to the EC (2002), less than 2000 producers receive more than 300 000 Euro, 7 % of
beneficiaries receive 50 % of direct payments and 70 % of beneficiaries receive less than 5 000
Euro (financial year 2000). 16
from the increase in budgetary allocations which remain very moderate relative to market
expenditure (within the Guarantee Section of the EAAGF, respectively 4.3 and 36.2 billion Euro per
year over the period 2000-06). The dynamic modulation mechanism included in the July 2002 MTR
proposals should have gradually increased funds available for the second pillar from nearly 700
million Euro the first year of application (including 204 million Euro from capping) to about 3.36
billion Euro the last year of application (including 100 million Euro from capping).
28 The way the
funds saved by the dynamic modulation would have been allocated on existing or newly introduced
rural development measures is difficult to predict. Contrary to the savings from capping that would
have been kept by each MS, the savings from digressivity would have been distributed to countries
“on the basis of their agricultural area, agricultural employment and a prosperity criterion to target
specific rural needs.” (CEC, 2002, page 23). Sumpsi and Buckwell (2002) rightfully point out that
ideally the criteria used for defining the redistribution rule of digressivity funds should have been
the demand for agri-environment services and rural development. They add that the three criteria
proposed by the EC are probably the most workable proxies. We can agree with their claim but as
very often, the devil can be in detail as most countries are likely to do all their possible to keep the
maximum of funds saved thanks to digressivety in their national accounts. Table 4.4 compares MS
annual indicative receipts from the Rural Development Regulation (EC) 1257/1999 with their
respective contributions to the second pillar through modulation. It also compares the financial
consequences of two allocation mechanisms of funds saved thanks to digressivety. The first
mechanism assumes that these funds are kept within each country while the second assumes that
they are redistributed using the Agenda 2000 repartition key set out in the Rural Development
Regulation (EC) 1257/1999. The latter would penalise first the UK in both absolute and relative
terms. It would hurt France in absolute value, but the loss would be less severe in relative value in
that country compared with the UK. Main winners would have been, in absolute terms Austria,
Ireland, Finland and Portugal, in relative terms Luxembourg, Austria, the Netherlands and Portugal.
The fact that some North-European countries such as Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium
would have gained while some South-European countries like Greece and Spain would have loose
means that the Agenda 2000 allocation key is no doubt a very bad proxy for environmental and
rural development services. 
(insert Table 4.4)
Let us now consider the degression and modulation mechanism of the January 2003 proposals. In
order to not hurt larger-scale farms of Eastern Germany, the EC has decided to suppress the
capping of the single whole-farm payment. According to the EC (2003), total amounts saved via
the degression and modulation mechanism would be equal to 3.34 billion Euro in 2012. This figure
is confirmed by Chatellier (2003) who finds that total amounts would be equal to 3.52 billion Euro
in 2012, of which 1.55 billion Euro only would be transferred to the second pillar (to be compared
with the figure of 3.26 billion Euro in the case of the July 2002 MTR proposals where all funds were
dedicated for rural development spending). Table 4.5 shows how MS and regions would be
unequally affected by the degression and modulation mechanism of the July 2003 proposals (this
table does not take into account how resources saved will be reallocated). Table 4.6 is the
counterpart of Table 4.4 but for the January 2003 proposals (this table does not take into account
how resources destined for financing future market needs will be reallocated). Conclusions derived
from tables 4.4 and 4.6 are qualitatively the same, in particular the classification of countries as
winners or losers in function of the repartition key adopted to allocate new resources of the second
pillar. 
(insert Table 4.5 and Table 4.6)
Income support direct aid: Tied to land or not?  
Some agricultural economists will argue that the MTR proposals do not go far enough to capture all
the benefits of decoupling. The extreme solution advocated by, for example, Swinbank and
Tangermann (2000), is to support agricultural incomes of established producers through a bond
scheme. To that end, they propose a six-step process under which Agenda 2000 area and headage
payments could be transformed into a fully decoupled bond scheme. Step 1 would involve the
decoupling of crop payments from current land use. Step 2 would extend this principle to livestock.
Step 3 would involve the decoupling of resulting payments from land and the attaching of
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entitlements to individuals. Step 4 would limit the duration of payments to, say, ten or twenty
years, and could make these payments digressive over time. Step 5 would fix definitively the
future level of payments while final step 6 would involve the transformation of payments
entitlements into bonds. They claim that the full benefits of their proposals would be achieved only
if the six steps are implemented, ideally at the same time transforming current payments into
bonds in one time.
29 They however grant that adopting only one or two steps can reap many
advantages of their solution. In practice, the MTR decoupling proposals include steps 1 and 2 as
well as one element of step 4 (reduction of payments over time). In theory, they could also include
step 3, i.e., the decoupling of payments from land and the attachment of entitlements to
individuals. Unfortunately the January 2003 proposals remain unclear on this point. The decoupled
farm income payment would be clearly decoupled from land use since it neither depends on the
type, nor the amount of the crop produced nor the level of the market price. However, in practice,
it is likely that payment entitlements would be transferred between farms of a same MS together
with the transfer of land although draft legal texts stipulate that they might be transferred by sale
with or without land (CEC, 2003, page 34).
30 Furthermore an entitlement transfer independently of
land would render the cross-compliance mechanism unworkable (Agra Europe, 2003). If this
interpretation is correct, it means that part of the decoupled farm income payment would be
capitalised in land prices (as it is the case today for area payments). As a result, land prices would
continue to be distorted reflecting in addition to market returns, the effects of government
intervention including the single decoupled direct aid per farm. The beneficiaries of the latter would
remain the current owners of land. Potential entrepreneurs without heritage or personal wealth
would continue to be artificially discouraged to enter.
31
Other agricultural economists like, for example, Buckwell (2002), consider that aid should stay
linked to land. The reasoning is the following. Political and administrative reasons prevent the
immediate and complete switch of current budgetary aids to environmental and rural development
payments. Cross-compliance requirements included in the MTR proposals represent good proxies
for longer-term conversion to environmental and territorial payments. During the adjustment
process, a large part of pillar one measures and pillar two payments will thus have the same
justification, i.e., to recompense land managers for their supply of non-market, environmental and
rural development measures which would not otherwise be provided, at the minimum under
provided relative to levels society desires. As a result, payments should stay linked to land both in
the transition period and in the long term.
This reasoning suffers from one drawback. Permanent transfers are obviously more easily
justifiable if they are payments for some legitimate public good or positive externality provision.
The environmental and countryside stewardship role of agricultural producers, be they land owners
or not, should be recognised and rewarded in its own right. This is in practice the route followed by
the MTR even if one can regret that the step in the right direction is still too timid. It is however
difficult to legitimate the MTR direct aid per farm on the grounds that it corresponds to
environmental and territorial services currently provided by land managers above legal minimal
standards reflected by cross-compliance requirements. The EC explicitly recognised that the 1992
direct aids “were introduced as compensation for a reduction in prices and therefore should be seen
as temporary adjustment aids aimed at helping producers to adapt to the new situation.” (EC,
1997a). This is still the case of the MTR direct aid per farm because it is not given in counterpart
for the explicit delivery of public environmental and territorial services above legal minimal
standards. The first objective of the MTR direct aid per farm remains farm income support. The
economic issue is not the validity of this political objective, but whether or not a decoupled direct
payment is the most efficient way of achieving it.
32 And for the sole objective of farm income
                                                          
29 In other words, the decomposition into six steps is proposed only for explanatory reasons. They
do not correspond to six successive phases, i.e., to a reform that should be gradually implemented.   
30 In addition, legal texts make clear that lease or similar type of transactions would be allowed
only if the entitlements transferred are accompanied by the transfer of an equivalent number of
eligible hectares (CEC, 2003, page 34). 
31 On this point, see Mahé and Ortalo-Magné (1999). 
32 Measuring agricultural incomes is very difficult, even conceptually. Evidence suggests that total
support to European farmers is very unequally distributed, first because support levels vary a lot
across commodities, second because market support and direct aids increase with farm size. This
will be still the case if the proposed decoupled direct payment per farm is implemented because the18
support, it is likely that the answer is yes. Furthermore continuing to link income support direct aid
to land raises the two issues of capitalisation of support in land price and barriers to entry (see
supra).
In fact, linking income support direct aid to land could be justified on other grounds. First there is
the question of land quantity that could be idle if the MTR decoupling proposals were implemented.
This problem is aggravated by the fact that such idling of land, if any, could be concentrated in
poorest agricultural regions with negative consequences for the countryside. Second there is the
related issue of the number of agricultural producers who could decide to cash the single direct aid
and quit production, with negative implications for rural development if this exit is concentrated in
less favoured regions and/or leads to large increases in farm sizes in other agricultural regions.
These issues should not be neither overestimated nor underestimated. Swinbank and Tangermann
(2000) consider that these two problems are not good reasons to argue against decoupling. For
these authors, it does not make good economic sense to shape the regime of payments for the
whole of the European territory only in order to avoid that too much land falls idle in some regions.
A more efficient approach would be to use specific and targeted policies in those regions. In the
same way, it does not make good economic sense to artificially maintain farmers in business. That
some producers decide to leave if income support is decoupled is seen as a positive development
for three reasons. It provides leaving farmers with the opportunity of looking for better jobs,
facilitates structural adjustment in agriculture and strengthens European agriculture
competitiveness.
From our point of view, land abandonment and rural depopulation are however two sufficient
reasons to, at least, analyse the advantages and the costs of an income support payment explicitly
linked to land versus a decoupled direct aid. The essential reason for agricultural producers to
receive annual payments is to reward them for providing environmental and rural development
services to society. Corresponding aids should be fully coupled to these non-market services,
permanent and non-digressive over time. As noted by Buckwell et al. (EC, 1997b), this turns the
attention towards defining these non-market goods and ensuring that the payments do relate to
their creation. Except risk, uncertainty and stability considerations, there are few economic
arguments for further transfers. This implies that the MTR income support aid should be designed
only to compensate for the loss in capital implied by lower market support.
33 It should be paid only
to allow adjustments by producers that would involve either expansion to compete at a lower cost
or retirement without bankruptcy. As a consequence, it should be digressive over time and
transitory, with an announced end-date. Throughout the transitional phase corresponding to the
progressive phasing-out of the income support aid and the concomitant phasing-in of
environmental and rural development support payments, the former could stay linked to land if a
full decoupling leads to effects (land abandonment and rural depopulation) too negative to ensure
an optimal provision of environmental and rural development services in the long term, especially
in marginal areas. Unfortunately existing macroeconomic agricultural models are not able to deal
satisfactorily with these issues. Primary factor markets are more often not explicitly modelled and
when they are represented, total agricultural land is fixed or exogenously defined. More generally,
one weakness of the MTR proposals is that they are not accompanied by evaluation studies
including impacts on land abandonment and the number of farms.
Uncertainty surrounds effects of the MTR proposals, especially the single decoupled direct aid per
farm, on producers’ behaviour, product choice and agricultural land use. The problem is not really
that changes in agricultural land use could occur. After all, one merit and one objective of the
decoupling of income support policy is that farmers will react more to market signals focusing “on
products which give them the best return from the market reflecting their skills, initiative and local
agronomic conditions.” (CEC, 2002, page 26). The problem is again support heterogeneity, both in
terms of levels and instruments, between commodities. Unlike a food potato producer, a starch
potato producer should benefit from the single decoupled direct aid and hence from a definitive
competitiveness advantage relative to the former.
34 In the same way, some producers of cereals or
                                                                                                                                                                                    
latter would be based on historical references. In other words, the MTR decoupled direct aid per
farm can be justified for efficiency reasons, not for equity motives.
33 Note however that this compensation motive gradually declines as first support price cuts were
introduced in 1992. 
34 According to the January 2003 proposals, 50 % of the current payment to producers of starch
potatoes would be included into the single farm payment, the remainder being maintained as a
crop specific payment for starch potatoes.   19
oilseeds who no longer have to plant crops to claim payments could switch to potatoes or field
vegetables. They also could decide to invest in pork and poultry production taking advantage of the
cash flow that represents the single decoupled direct aid.
35 A related problem is that these changes
in agricultural land use could occur very (too) quickly causing market price declines and bankruptcy
of disadvantaged producers.
36 A possible solution to this potential problem would be to gradually
increase the quantity of land on which beneficiaries from the single decoupled direct aid would
have full flexibility on all crops, including haying and grazing. 
Parallels with the 1996 US FAIR ACT
MTR opponents will argue that it does not make sense to apply in the EU a political recipe (the
decoupling) that was at the heart of the US Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR)
Act of 1996, given the failure of the latter. Obvious parallels can be drawn between the US
Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments and the EU single decoupled direct aid per farm.
And one knows what happens in the US, i.e., the abandon of an exemplary policy structure with
respect to market orientation in favour of an explicit recoupling of the US agricultural policy at the
opportunity of the Farm Security and Rural Investment (FRSIA) Act of 2002. It is clearly beyond
the scope of this paper to propose a thorough analysis of the FRSIA Act and its potential effects on
US production and trade, world prices and WTO negotiations. In particular, whether or not these
reforms will comply with current and future WTO requirements remains to be seen (on this point,
see, for example, Haniotis, 2002). At this stage, one will simply note that the problem is not really
a problem of income support, but more a problem of income stability. A price support policy allows
policy makers to simultaneously achieve two objectives, agricultural income support and
agricultural price and market stability. Direct aids, whether they are coupled or decoupled, are
likely a more efficient policy instrument to support agricultural incomes, but not to stabilise
agricultural prices and markets (note however that they contribute to stabilise farmers’ incomes by
ensuring a sure transfer from taxpayers to agricultural producers). As future markets are
incomplete in agriculture, there is clearly room and legitimacy for public intervention in this area. It
is not sure that safety net mechanisms scheduled by the EC in its MTR proposals will be sufficient
to stabilise agricultural prices and markets in a efficient way, in particular for animal productions.
There are clearly lessons to derive from the case of pork and poultry. 
Cross-compliance requirements and rural development measures: A question of
agricultural land use rights   
Good farming practices and beyond: The use of a red and green ticket strategy. The MTR
proposals make the full granting of the single decoupled farm income payment and other (coupled)
direct aids conditional “on the respect of a certain number of statutory environmental, food safety
and animal health and welfare standards, as well as occupational safety requirements for farmers.”
(CEC, 2002, page 21). In the case of non-respect of these standards and requirements, direct
payments should be reduced. According to the EC, attaching such conditions to farmers’ support
payments is a way of improving and supporting the enforcement of “good farming practices”
defined as encompassing mandatory standards. This approach known as cross compliance is given
new emphasis in the EU following Agenda 2000. However cross compliance in Agenda 2000 is
restricted to environment making the payments of hectare and headage direct aids possibly
dependent upon compliance with environmental criteria. Agenda 2000 gives MS very wide
discretion in deciding on the measures to be taken with the result that environmental cross
                                                          
35 The switch to milk and sugar, two of the most supported agricultural commodities in the EU, is
largely precluded as long as these productions remain controlled by quotas (Swinbank and
Tangermann, 2000).  
36  In the case of France, preliminary simulation results suggest that in the medium term land
devoted to cereals, oilseeds and protein crops would decrease by about 7.3 % while land devoted
to forage would increase by about 8.5 % (relative to the base year corresponding to “average”
2004-06). Production would decrease by 6.0 % for wheat, 8.7 % for barley, 3.4 % for corn and 5.1
% for oilseeds. Beef production would slightly decrease (-0.7 %) thanks to an extensification
effect. Pork and poultry production increases would be very small, 0.3 % and 0.4 % respectively.
For more details, see Gohin (2002).    20
compliance is not really an obligation, but an option left to countries’ discretion. In practice, there
are currently no further requirements than to comply with relevant national legislation as the
definition of reference levels and environmental conditions have been left entirely to MS. Building
on this embryo, the MTR proposals aim then to strengthen cross compliance by making it
obligatory at the EU level and extending its scope (inclusion of food safety and animal welfare
conditions). Cross compliance would be based on a whole farm approach, with conditions attached
to both used and unused agricultural, and farm audits. The focus of farm audits would be material
flows and on-farm processes relating to environmental, food safety, animal welfare and
occupational safety standards. Farm auditing would be mandatory as part of cross-compliance
requirements. In the same way, the long-term (10 years) non-rotational set-aside on arable land
would also be an element of cross-compliance requirements.
37
The MTR proposals on cross compliance can be interpreted as an application of the so-called red
ticket approach (Batie and Sappington, 1986). Eligibility to the single decoupled direct aid per farm
and other direct payments would be made contingent upon farmers complying with statutory
standards and there would be partial or complete withdrawal of payments in the case of non-
compliance. In addition, the MTR proposals would extend the scope of the current development
rural regulation by introducing a new chapter called “meeting standards” to “help farmers to adapt
to demanding standards based on Community legislation in the field of the environment, food
safety and animal welfare as well as implementing farm audits.” (CEC, 2002, page 24). Temporary
and digressive direct aids, for a period of maximum five years and up to a maximum of 200 Euro
per hectare the first year, could be granted to farmers to compensate for the loss of income
implied by European standard adoption.
38 Support for farm audits would be given under the form of
a flat-rate aid. 
The red ticket approach described above, making income support direct aids contingent upon
farmers’ attainment of statutory standards, would be supplemented by the augmented use of the
so-called green ticket approach allowing farmers to receive additional support if they exceed
mandatory standards, i.e., for efforts that go beyond minimum reference levels.
39 Agenda 2000
explicitly recognises the essential role that farmers (can) play in providing environmental services
that go beyond basic legal standards. To that end, direct aids are granted to farmers who
undertake agri-environmental commitments for a minimum of five years. Annual aids are
calculated according to the income loss and additional costs resulting from the undertakings, as
well as the need to provide a financial incentive. Maximum payments are 600 Euro per hectare for
annual crops, 900 Euro per hectare for specialised perennial crops and 450 Euro per hectare for
other types of land use (EC, 1999a). The MTR proposals would strengthen (environment) and
extend (food safety and animal welfare) the green ticket approach initiated in Agenda 2000. Funds
available for these measures would be increased thanks to the degression and modulation
mechanism (see Table 4.3). 
                                                          
37 Producers currently subject to the set-aside obligation will continue to set-aside an area equal to
10 % of their current COP surface for receipt of the single whole-farm payment. This set-aside
would be non-rotational and would apply for a period of ten years starting on 1 January 2004 (CEC,
2003). Unfortunately this long-term set-aside does not target land parcels that are the most
sensitive from an environmental point of view. In most cases, the set-aside of normal land is not
justified from both an economic and environmental point of view (wasting of economic resources
and unclear environmental benefits). However it is generally recognised that the environmental
value of set-aside land increases the longer it is left uncultivated. In practice, it appears that this
new set-aside instrumentation pursues not only environmental objectives, but also supply control
objectives which are not very well justified if the January 2003 MTR proposals were applied.      
38 The EC document however makes clear that “in no case would aid [understood meeting standard
aid] be payable where the non-application of standards is due to the non-respect by an individual
farmer of standards already incorporated in national legislation.” (CEC, 2002, page 25).
39 Cross-compliance policies generally include both the red and green ticket approach, as well as
the so-called orange ticket approach where eligibility for agricultural support payments is
dependent on farmer enrolment in an otherwise voluntary scheme which attracts incentive
payments (Baldock, 1993; Baldock and Mitchell, 1995). However the green ticket approach cannot
properly be considered as a cross-compliance policy since payments are in addition to basic
support levels (Webster and Williams, 2000). In the EC document, cross compliance is implicitly
restricted to the red ticket approach. We also follow this narrow definition of cross compliance.    21
Long-term sustainability of the red and green ticket strategy. The red ticket approach of the
MTR recognises that as a minimum, farmers should respect basic requirements as regards
environmental, food safety and animal welfare concerns without specific payment. In other words,
the farmer has not the right to manage his property freely as he must comply with mandatory
standards. In the case of non-compliance, negative incentives should be theoretically used. In the
MTR proposals, they would take the palliative form of a partial, possibly complete, withdrawal of
the single direct aid per farm and other direct payments. Several rural development measures are
consistent with the green ticket approach.
40 They are based on the principle that land use rights
above the statutory levels embraced in legislation and reflected in red ticket cross-compliance
requirements are private property of the land user. If society asks farmers to pursue
environmental, food safety or animal wealth objectives beyond these statutory levels, then society
must pay for those public services. And payments should be permanent and non-digressive.    
The main weakness of the MTR proposals on cross-compliance is that they explicitly exclude some
commodities and some producers by targeting only farmers who are eligible for largest income
support direct aids. Again the root of the problem lies in the unequal distribution of support, both in
terms of levels and instruments, across commodities, farms, regions and countries. Sumpsi and
Buckwell (2002) rightfully point out that all food, not only food covered by income support direct
aids, should be subject to food safety regulation and sanctions for non-compliance. This remark
also applies to animal wealth or environment. There is non-sense to enforce minimum animal
wealth standards through cross compliance in the beef sector and not in the pig and poultry
industry. In the same way, there is non-sense to exclude some farmers from environmental cross-
compliance requirements on the grounds that they produce commodities that are little or not
supported by income direct aids. All farmers regardless of specialisation or size should follow law
and in the case of non-respect, should be penalised. 
The red ticket approach should be used to ensure that agricultural producers comply with the
legislation in force and to improve conformity with good agricultural practices if this concept is
broader than statutory standards. The EC suggests that this is the case since good farming
practices are explicitly defined as encompassing mandatory standards (CEC, 2002, page 21). The
two notions should ideally be synonymous. If there exists a gap, it should be temporary reflecting
the fact that good farming practices change over time with growing scientific knowledge and
increasing standards of living. A delay is inevitable to translate these changes into legislation. 
5.  Concluding Comments
The MTR proposals are likely to be sufficient to comply with future WTO commitments on the
domestic support dossier. They would allow the EU to concentrate efforts on its main Achilles’ heel
in the current round of WTO agricultural negotiations, i.e., the necessity to maintain a sufficient
import protection over say, the next ten years, in particular in sectors where the EU price
competitiveness is still very low and price support is still very high. The overall sustainability of the
MTR package, more generally of the European model of agriculture proposed by the EC, requires
maintenance of a sufficient frontier protection over the next decade to prevent surge increases in
imports. This is a necessary condition to sell the reform to current farmers and pursue the long-
term process, initiated within the 1992 MacSharry reform, aiming at increasing the price
competitiveness of European agricultural products and promoting European agricultural trade on a
fair basis. 
The MTR proposals present other advantages. They would improve transfer efficiency from
taxpayers to producers and increase funds available for rural development measures. On this point,
one can regret the lowness of the fund switching from the first to the second pillar entailed in the
January 2003 proposals. Note however that the EC makes clear that this transfer is only “a first
step in the necessary reinforcement of rural development, without prejudice to future discussions.”
(CEC, 2003, page 5). This statement clearly “reflects the continuing evolution in what is considered
important for EU agriculture, i.e., a much greater emphasis on food quality and safety, protection
of the environment, animal welfare and rural development to meet the growing demand of
[domestic] consumers and environmentalists.” (Kelch et al., 2002). At this stage, one can simply
regret that the EC does not precise the next steps of its reform, in particular the way pillar one
                                                          
40 This is not the case for all rural development measures, for example the early retirement scheme
or aids available for the processing and marketing of agricultural products. 22
funds would (should) be reduced after 2012 and simultaneously the way funds saved in this way
would (should) be allocated on pillar two measures. Current and future farmers need clear and
stable game rules. It would be a great mistake to give farmers the impression that the 2012
repartition of funds between the first and the second pillar should not evolve after that date. Many
MS condemn the EC proposals for being too radical. This is clearly reflected by immediate reactions
of the French Minister of Agriculture to the July 2002 proposals. The latter considers that the MTR
proposals “go far beyond the mandate defined by the Heads of States and Governments at Berlin in
1999 which does not intend for the MTR any more than a certain number of technical changes,
where necessary, based on experience to date.” He adds that he “cannot subscribe to the [EC]
approach as [it is not possible] to define in a matter of weeks the future of the CAP, any more you
can change it every three years it.“ (Gaymard 2002).
41 The last remark clearly applies to the MTR
proposals. Game rules should be defined not only for the budgetary period 2006-13, but also for
the longer term to give farmers right political signals they need to take their investment decisions.
This remark also applies to compromise solutions proposed by some MS, notably France. A solution
of partial decoupling, be it horizontal (inclusion of current direct aids into the single farm payment
for some commodities only) and/or vertical (inclusion of a certain percentage of current direct aids
into the single farm payment for all commodities, the rest being maintained as product specific
payments), would allow to go out from the current political deadlock. Such a political compromise
is not a solution for the long term and very quickly would lead to a reopening of discussions. 
Several aspects of the MTR proposals raise questions. Some of them have been analysed in this
paper: impact on land prices, land use, land abandonment, the number of farms, etc. All these
issues merit detailed impact analyses at a local level, in particular in intermediate regions and less
favoured areas. The multifunctional character of European agriculture is well accepted. The general
philosophy underpinning the MTR proposals is that agricultural producers should observe minimum
levels of good agricultural practices but that additional public services above these minimum levels
should be paid for by the society through targeted measures. Unfortunately MTR second pillar
measures are likely to be too complex and too general to guarantee that they automatically will
lead to a reduction of negative external effects and an augmentation of positive external effects. As
noted by Bureau (2002), the MTR proposals on decoupling amount, to a large extent, to freeze the
current distribution of budgetary support across farmers, regions and countries. As a result, they
would continue to favour the largest and more intensive farms. In other words, the MTR proposals
do not address the question of small and poor farmers, very often located in marginal zones where
agriculture is still a major economic activity and where employment alternatives are seldom. In the
same way, the MTR do not satisfactorily address the question of agricultural price and income
instability. Income support expenditure should be significantly reduced and funds saved in this way
used to implement public stabilisation programmes. 
                                                          
41  Quoted in The Scottish Parliament, The Information Centre, 31 July 2002, translation of H.
Gaymard’s speech at the Council of Agricultural Ministers on the 15
th July 2002.23
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Table 2.1. Main agricultural commodity regimes in the European Union under Agenda
2000
Policies
Commodity Market and income Income  Supply control 
Cereals Export refunds




Hectare payments Compulsory set-aside









(quotas A and B)
Possibility to produce




Import tariffs (and tariff quotas)
Intervention mechanism
(minimum guaranteed production











Import tariffs (and tariff quotas)
Intervention mechanism as a
safety net
Aids to private storage
Animal payments Headage limits
Stocking density limits
Pigmeat Export refunds
Import tariffs (and tariff quotas)





Import tariffs (and tariff quotas)
- -
Source: From CAP Monitor, 2002. (1) Restriction no longer in force pending any WTO challenge.27
Table 2.2. Support in the European Union for some agricultural commodities (million Euro)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001P
EU agricultural sector
PSE 88329 84784 81880 78380 93455 113165 95487 95190 94761 96123 91727 92664 102330 108241 97244 103937
- MPS  77346 72 810  68503 62048 75815 91934 73355 66245 61114 59795 50925 51866 63971 70618 57573 60620
- PBAAN 1980 2325 2945 3787 4562 5080 9046 15195 19848 24200 25873 24487 24733 23675 25977 27954
PSE in %  52 39 36 36 37 44 38 37 35 35 32 32 36 39 34 35
Wheat
PSE 8246 8298 7076 4283 6112 10319 7354 8922 9087 8692 6505 7188 9756 10633 9903 9163
- MPS  7488 7514 6219 3211 4834 8801 5659 4473 3041 1601 -1258 -346 2205 2898 1031 91
- PBA 364 383 450 566 695 701 629 3621 5278 6363 6797 6524 6487 6521 7481 7747
PSE in % 54 56 47 26 39 57 46 52 51 44 30 36 49 55 46 44
Oilseeds
PSE 2691 3033 2759 3586 3665 3793 2125 2056 1921 2159 2057 2142 2172 1608 2085 1963
- MPS  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- PBA 3 5 6 9 11 11 1909 1819 1662 1928 1783 1824 1828 1200 1676 1517
PSE in % 62 61 53 59 64 62 52 48 40 44 42 38 37 35 42 40
Sugar
PSE  2985 2916 2734 1894 2330 2848 3770 3052 4313 2222 2534 2789 2898 3326 2699 2397
- MPS  2897 2821 2634 1783 2202 2703 3068 2698 2116 1930 2256 2494 2622 3026 2488 2207
PSE in % 63 62 55 36 45 55 64 55 60 42 46 48 54 60 50 46
Milk
PSE 20528 18337 16662 17285 21336 20848 20887 21114 20348 21546 20534 19835 22325 19185 16752 16077
- MPS  19568 17407 15096 15610 19642 18909 18858 18449 18145 18905 18315 17670 20545 17337 14978 14407
PSE in %  63 58 51 49 62 59 59 59 57 54 52 51 58 51 43 40
Beef
PSE 16163 13505 11319 12530 14426 18768 16139 13585 14078 15180 17098 21045 20629 21178 18949 23945
- MPS  14474 11995 9489 10395 11914 16165 13039 9918 8611 8581 7643 11460 12290 13226 11866 13506
- PBAN 706 665 835 1206 1635 1711 2043 2025 3861 4911 6158 5594 5852 5671 5483 6489
PSE in % 70 59 48 52 61 78 64 52 52 53 61 74 77 83 78 91
Source: OECD, PSE/CSE database 2002. PSE: Producer support estimate. MPS: Market price support. PBAAN: Payments based on area planted and/or
animal numbers. PBA: Payments based on area planted. PBAN: Payments based on animal numbers. PSE in %: Ratio of the PSE to the value of total
gross farm receipts. P: provisional.28
Table 2.3.  Comparison of Agenda 2000 provisions, July 2002 MTR proposals and January 2003 MTR proposals
MTR proposals
Agenda 2000 Communication (July 2002) Draft legal texts (January 2003)
-  Partial decoupling of income support direct
aids
Commodity-specific income support direct aids
for arable crops, rice, beef, sheep and milk (1)
-  Decoupling of income support policy
Single whole-farm income support payment
based on historical payments for arable crops,
rice, beef, sheep and milk (2) 
No production is required and almost full farming
flexibility
-  Decoupling of income support policy
Single whole-farm income support payment
based on historical payments (2000, 2001 and
2002) for arable crops, rice, beef, sheep, milk,
seeds; certain regional aids are included
No production is required and almost full farming
flexibility
-  Optional cross-compliance at a national level
Possibility for MS to condition commodity-
specific income support direct aids to specific
environmental requirements
If no compliance, possibility for MS to reduce
direct payments
- Compulsory cross-compliance at the EU level
All direct payments conditional on the respect of
statutory legal standards which cover food
safety, environmental protection, animal welfare
and occupational safety 
If no compliance, partial or entire reduction of
direct payments  
- Compulsory cross-compliance at the EU level
All direct payments conditional on the respect of
forty legislative acts applying directly at the farm
level (minimal list, possibility for MS to
complement these minimal requirements) with
good farming practice and maintaining
permanent pasture
If no compliance, partial or entire reduction of
direct payments
-  Optional modulation at a national level
Possibility for MS to increase second pillar
funding under optional national modulation
programs
-  Compulsory “dynamic modulation” at the EU
level
All direct payments (i.e., direct payments of
pillar one) reduced by 3 % per year from 2004
up to a maximum of 20 % (modulation
mechanism) 
Small farms (farms receiving less than 5 000
Euro per year in direct aids) exempt from
payment cuts (franchise mechanism)
-  Compulsory “degression and modulation” at
the EU level
All direct payments reduced from 1 % in 2006 to
12 % in 2012 (farms receiving between 5 001
and 50 000 Euro per year in direct aids) or 19 %
in 2012 (farms receiving more than 50 000 Euro
per year in direct aids)
Small farms exempt from payment cuts 29
Introduction of a ceiling (300 000 Euro per year)
on direct aids an individual farm can receive
(capping mechanism)
Suppression of the capping mechanism
-  Rural development as the second pillar
 Rural development funding at about 4.5 billion
Euro per year 
-  Strengthening the second pillar
Annual spending on rural development nearly
doubled
Introduction of new measures related to food
quality, meeting standards, support for farm
audit and animal welfare
 
-  Strengthening the second pillar
Annual spending on rural development
augmented by 228 million Euro in 2006 to 1 481
million Euro in 2012
Introduction of new measures related to food
quality, meeting standards, support for farm
audit and animal welfare
Source: CEC, 2002 and 2003. (1) In the case of milk, from 2005/06. (2) The long-run objective is to include as many sectors as possible. As a result,
other sectors scheduled for reform (sugar, olive oil, some fruit and vegetables, etc.) could (should) follow later. 30
Table 2.4. The MTR proposals: domestic policy objectives and instruments
Objectives (1) Instruments
A competitive agricultural sector   Market orientation: public intervention as a
safety net only and decoupling of income
support direct aids
Production methods that support
environmentally friendly, quality products that
the public wants
Respect of minimum legal standards: cross-
compliance requirements and strengthening
second pillar measures
Fair standard of living and income stability for
the agricultural community
Income support direct payments and public
intervention as a safety net
Diversity in forms of agriculture, maintaining
visual amenities and supporting rural
communities
Fund switching from the first to the second pillar
(dynamic modulation) and strengthening second
pillar measures
Simplicity Decoupling of income support direct aids
Justification of support through the provision of
services that the public expects farmers to
provide
Cross-compliance and strengthening second
pillar measures
(1) Policy objectives as presented in the explanatory memorandum of the Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (CEC, 2002) 31
Table 2.5. Degression and modulation in the January 2003 MTR proposals
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Percentage of reduction in function of annual amounts of direct aids received by a
farm
- from 1 to 5 000 Euro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- from 5 000 to 50 000
Euro
1 3 7.5 9 10.5 12 12.5
- above 50 000 Euro 1 4 12 14 16 18 19
Of which percentage reallocated on measures of the second pillar
- from 5 001 to 50 000
Euro
1 2 3 4 5 6 6
- above 50 000 Euro 1 2 3 4 5 6 6
Of which percentage reallocated for financing future market needs
- from 5 001 to 50 000
Euro
0 1 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5
- above 50 000 Euro 0 2 9 10 11 12 13
Source: CEC, 2003.32
Table 3.1. Import penetration and import shares (in volume) in the European Union
Import penetration ratio (1) Share in world import volume
1986-89 1990-94 1995-99 1986-89 1990-94 1995-99
Wheat 3.2 2.0 3.2 2.6 1.7 3.2
Rice 36.1 31.8 28.1 7.4 6.1 4.1
Coarse
grains
4.1 3.6 3.4 4.6 3.6 3.6
Sugar 15.0 14.3 13.5 7.6 7.1 5.6
Bovine meat 4.6 5.2 5.3 10.3 9.0 7.5
Skim milk
powder
3.2 2.5 6.7 3.7 2.6 5.1
Butter 4.1 4.0 5.3 8.3 8.7 12.8
Cheese 1.8 1.6 1.9 12.0 10.4 10.3
Pig meat 0.5 0.3 0.4 5.0 2.7 2.1
Poultry meat 2.0 3.0 3.6 7.9 7.9 5.7
Source: OECD (2002). Excluding intra-EU trade. (1) Import penetration: Ratio of agricultural
imports to apparent consumption in volume. 33
Table 3.2. AMS ceilings, notified AMS, blue and green box support in the European Union,
1995/96-1999/00 (in billion Euro)
  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00
AMS ceiling (1) 78.672 76.369 74.067 71.765 69.643
Notified AMS (2) 47.5264 51.0090 50.1940 46.6830 47.8857
Blue box support (3) 20.8455 21.5208 20.4428 20.5035 19.7921
Green box support 18.7792 22.1304 18.1668 19.168 19.9305
Difference
(1) – (2) 31.1456 25.3600 23.8730 25.0820 21.7573
(1) – (2) – (3)  10.3001 3.8392 3.4302 4.5785 1.9652
Source: Adapted from Anania (2002).34







- Important sectors not yet covered by the program (milk, sugar, olive oil, tobacco, etc.) and
unlikely to be fully integrated because of the budgetary constraint
- Equity issues only very partially addressed because payments are based on historical references,
but potential correction of the uneven distribution of current direct aids thanks to the degression
and modulation mechanism
- “Optimal” allocation of funds between first and second pillar budgetary measures in the long term
- Potential capitalisation of the single decoupled direct payment per farm into land price, notably in
function of the option or not to sell part of payment entitlements independently or not of land;
More generally, questions of support capitalisation in land prices and barriers to entry for new
farmers without heritage or personal wealth
Land hectares that could be idle (concentration in less favoured regions) and number of farmers
who could quit production (concentration in less favoured regions where agriculture is still the
buttress of the rural economy)  35
Table 4.2. Impact on pillar one direct payments of the dynamic modulation
mechanism of the July 2002 MTR proposals (in million Euro)
Digressivity rate of 3 % Digressivity rate of 20 %
Modulation Capping Total Modulation Capping Total
Belgium 4 0 4 25 0 25
Denmark 14 1 15 93 0 93
Germany 74 182 256 493 92 585
 -west 38 0 38 252 0 252
 -east 36 182 218 241 92 333
Greece 19 0 19 124 0 124
Spain 57 4 61 379 1 380
France 146 0 146 971 0 971
Ireland 8 0 8 56 0 56
Italy 39 11 50 261 3 264
Luxembourg 0 0 0 2 0 2
Netherlands 1 0 1 9 0 9
Austria 5 0 5 31 0 31
Portugal 5 0 5 31 0 31
Finland 14 0 14 95 0 95
Sweden 8 0 8 50 0 50
UK 96 7 103 643 3 646
EU-15 490 204 694 3263 100 3363
Source: Kleinhanss, 2002.36
Table 4.3. Area and animal premiums in the European Union at Member State level (1998)
Area premiums Animal premiums
cereals oilseeds set-aside total cattle goats Total
Total
EU15 (million
Euro) 11784 3115 1263 16162 4253 1535 5788 21950
(per cent of
EU15)
Belgium 1.1 0.1 0.4 0.9 2.6 0.1 2 1.2
Denmark 4.1 2.7 4.6 3.9 1.1 0.1 0.8 3.1
Germany 20.4 18.1 24.4 20.3 8.2 2.3 6.7 16.7
Greece 3.8 0.3 0.2 2.8 1.2 10.3 3.6 3
Spain 9.7 9.7 13.9 10 9.3 27.3 14.1 11.1
France 28.2 38.3 29.5 30.2 25.1 10.2 21.1 27.9
Ireland 0.9 0.2 1.3 0.8 12.8 7.1 11.3 3.5
Italy 12.3 13 5.1 11.8 4.5 8.3 5.5 10.2
Luxembourg 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1
Holland 1.1 0 0.3 0.8 1.3 0.7 1.1 0.9
Austria 2.2 2 2 2.2 2.3 0.1 1.7 2
Portugal 1.1 0.6 0.4 1 2 3.4 2.4 1.3
Finland 1.5 0.6 2.3 1.4 0.9 0.1 0.7 1.2
Sweden 2.7 1.3 4.9 2.6 1.8 0.2 1.3 2.3
UK 10.8 13.1 10.7 11.2 26.8 29.8 27.6 15.5
Source: Melgaard and Frandsen (2002).37
Table 4.4.  Rural development measures: Comparison of receipts under Agenda 2000 and July 2002 MTR proposals (Guarantee Section of
the EAGGF, annual average)             
Member States B DK D GR SP FR IRL I L NL A P FIN SW UK Total
Rural development measures under Agenda 2000 
Million Euro 50 46 700 131 459 760 315 595 12 55 423 200 290 149 154 4339
% 1.2 1.1 16.1 3 10.6 17.5 7.3 13.7 0.3 1.3 9.7 4.6 6.7 3.4 3.5 100
Funds saved via modulation (digressivity rate of 20 %, capping funds excluded) 
Million Euro 25 93 493 124 379 971 56 261 2 9 31 31 95 50 643 3263
% 0.8 2.9 15.1 3.8 11.6 29.8 1.7 8.0 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.9 2.9 1.5 19.7 100
Pillar two resources under MTR assuming that digressivity funds are kept within each country (million Euro) (1)
Excluding capping 75 139 1193 255 838 1731 371 856 14 64 454 231 385 199 797 7602
Including capping 75 139 1285 255 839 1731 371 859 14 64 454 231 385 199 800 7701
Pillar two resources under MTR assuming that digressivity funds are redistributed using the Agenda 2000 repartition key set out in the Rural
Development Regulation (EC) 1257/1999 (million Euro) (2)
Excluding capping 91.2 83.6 1223.9 228.1 805.8 1330.4 554.9 1041.5 22.8 98.8 737.4 349.7 509.3 258.5 266.1 7602
Including capping 91.2 83.6 1315.9 228.1 806.8 1330.4 554.9 1044.5 22.8 98.8 737.4 349.7 509.3 258.5 269.1 7701
Difference (2) - (1) 16.2 -55.4 30.9 -26.9 -32.2 -400.6 183.9 185.5 8.8 34.8 283.4 118.7 124.3 59.5 -530.9 0
Difference in % 21.6 -39.9 2.6 -10.5 -3.8 -23.1 49.6 21.7 62.9 54.4 62.4 51.4 32.3 29.9 -66.6 0
Agricultural area
(%)
1.0 2.0 12.9 2.6 21.7 22.4 3.3 11.4 0.1 1.5 2.6 2.8 1.6 2.3 11.8 100
Agricultural
employment (%)
0.8 0.9 8.3 10.8 16.9 9.5 1.9 31.2 0.1 1.9 3.5 7.3 1.5 1.1 4.3 100
Source: EC(1999a) DGA Fac-Sheet on “CAP reform: Rural development”, Kleinhanss (2002) and authors’ calculations.38
Table 4.5. Impact of the degression and modulation mechanism of the January 2003 MTR











Finland 48 900 88.7% -1 570 -9.2% -77
Sweden 35 300 88.9% -2 080 -10.0% -73
Austria 55 200 64.8% -950 -7.6% -53
Ireland 90 500 70.3% -1 230 -8.4% -111
United-Kingdom 120 100 90.5% -5 500 -13.0% -661
     UK-North 47 000 96.2% -4 250 -12.1% -200
     UK-Centre 46 200 89.1% -5 370 -12.7% -248
     UK-East 26 900 84.1% -7 900 -14.1% -213
Denmark 41 500 84.8% -2 560 -10.6% -106
Netherlands 42 700 53.0% -1 830 -9.5% -78
Belgium & Luxembourg 31 400 72.7% -1 700 -9.2% -53
Germany 217 600 78.6% -2 940 -11.6% -640
    Germany-North 52 400 88.7% -2 370 -10.1% -124
    Germany-East 11 500 90.3% -25 740 -16.9% -295
    Germany-West 78 200 72.5% -1 550 -9.0% -121
    Germany-Bayern 75 500 77.7% -1 310 -8.5% -99
France 322 400 79.6% -3 000 -10.9% -967
    France-North-Paris 35 100 93.2% -4 090 -11.5% -144
    France-Centre  46 800 81.7% -5 150 -12.1% -241
    France-West 77 000 87.1% -2 470 -10.2% -190
    France-East 20 100 89.8% -3 770 -11.5% -76
    France-Massif Central 30 900 96.5% -2 010 -9.7% -62
    France-South West 81 700 84.6% -2 410 -10.4% -197
    France-South East 30 800 43.6% -1 860 -9.6% -57
Italy 206 900 19.7% -1 300 -8.9% -270
    Italy-North 79 900 23.3% -1 570 -9.4% -125
    Italy-Others 127 000 17.9% -1 140 -8.5% -144
Spain 234 900 38.2% -1 330 -8.8% -312
    Spain-North 25 300 32.0% -690 -6.6% -17
    Spain-Others 209 500 39.1% -1 410 -9.0% -295
Portugal 21 700 6.9% -1 520 -9.5% -33
Greece 131 100 25.7% -700 -6.6% -92
European Union  1 600 100 42.2% -2 200 -10.4% -3 526
Source: Chatellier (2003). 39
Table 4.6.  Rural development measures: Comparison of receipts under Agenda 2000 and January 2003  MTR proposals (Guarantee
Section of the EAGGF, annual average)             
Member States B DK D GR SP FR IRL I L NL A P FIN SW UK Total
Rural development measures under Agenda 2000 
Million Euro 50 46 700 131 459 760 315 595 12 55 423 200 290 149 154 4339
% 1.2 1.1 16.1 3 10.6 17.5 7.3 13.7 0.3 1.3 9.7 4.6 6.7 3.4 3.5 100
Funds saved through degression and modulation (year 2012) 
Million Euro 49 106 640 92 312 967 111 270 4 78 53 33 77 73 661 3526
% 1.4 3 18.2 2.6 8.8 27.4 3.1 7.7 0.1 2.2 1.5 0.9 2.2 2.1 18.7 100
Funds saved through degression and modulation available for rural development by country (6 % in 2012)
Million Euro 25.1 50.3 258.6 42.9 141.1 441.9 55.8 125.9 2 39.5 26.7 13.5 40.2 33.8 249.7 1547
Pillar two resources under MTR assuming that modulation funds are kept within each country (million Euro) (1)
Million Euro 75.1 96.3 958.6 173.9 600.1 1201.9 370.8 720.9 14 94.5 449.7 213.5 330.2 182.8 403.7 5886
Pillar two resources under MTR assuming that modulation funds are redistributed using the Agenda 2000 repartition key set out in the Rural Development
Regulation (EC) 1257/1999 (million Euro) (2)
Million Euro 70.6 64.7 947.6 176.6 623.9 1030.1 429.7 806.4 17.7 76.5 570.9 270.8 394.4 200.1 206 5886
Difference (2) - (1) -4.5 -31.6 -11 2.7 23.8 -171.8 58.9 85.5 3.7 -18 121.2 57.3 64.2 17.3 -197.7 0
Difference in % -6 -32.8 -1.1 1.6 4 -14.3 15.9 11.9 26.4 -19 27 26.8 19.5 9.5 -49 0
Agricultural area
(%)
1.0 2.0 12.9 2.6 21.7 22.4 3.3 11.4 0.1 1.5 2.6 2.8 1.6 2.3 11.8 100
Agricultural
employment (%)
0.8 0.9 8.3 10.8 16.9 9.5 1.9 31.2 0.1 1.9 3.5 7.3 1.5 1.1 4.3 100
GDP per
inhabitant* 
23 343 23 997 22 463 14 277 16 953 21 395 23 226 20 449 25 980 21 713 23 178 15 111 20 886 19 985 20 348 20 610
Source: EC (1999a) DGA Fac-Sheet on “CAP reform: Rural development”, Chatellier (2003) and authors’ calculations.*: Purchasing Power Standard.40
Annex 1. Regulation (EC) 1257/1999 on rural development: Main dispositions (Sources:
Regulation (EC) 1257/1999 of 17 May 1999; EC, 1999a, DGA Fac-Sheet on “CAP reform:
Rural development”; CAP Monitor, 2002, Section 1)   
Measures 
1. Investments in farm businesses
Support for investments in farm businesses with the aim of modernising farming machinery,
equipment and systems, to improve incomes as well as the living standards and the working and
production conditions of farmers.
2. Human resources: young farmers, early retirement and training
Aids for promoting the entry of young farmers, for early retirement (accompanying measure) and
for training initiatives.
3. Less favoured areas and areas subject to environmental constraints (accompanying measure)
Compensatory payments for farmers in less favoured areas (mountains areas, areas threatened
with abandonment, areas affected by specific handicaps) and areas subject to environmental
constraints. Adaptation of payments to fit the role farmers must play in managing these areas (in
concrete terms, aids per hectare instead of per head of livestock).
4. Forests
Aids for woodland which is owned by individuals, associations and local authorities covering
numerous measures, notably investment aids, and aids for the forestation of agricultural land
(accompanying measure) to cover management costs (up to a maximum of 5 years) and
compensate for losses due to forestation (up to a maximum of 25 years).
5. Processing and marketing of agricultural products
Aids for the processing and marketing of agricultural products.
6. Agri-environment (accompanying measure)
Aids to farmers who undertake agri-environmental commitments for a minimum period of 5 years;
aids granted annually and calculated according to the income loss and additional costs resulting
from the undertakings as well as the need to provide a financial incentive (maximum of 600 Euro
per hectare for annual crops, 900 Euro per hectare for specialised perennial crops and 450 Euro per
hectare for other types of land use).
7. Various measures for the general development of rural areas
Aids for land improvement, reparcelling, setting-up farm relief and farm management services,
basic services for the rural economy and the population, renovation and development of villages,
protection and conservation of the rural heritage, diversification of agricultural activities as well as
activities close to agriculture to provide multiple activities and alternative incomes, agricultural
water resources management.
Financing
Rural development measures are financed by the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF, i.e., the section
of the EU budget which also covers market expenditure of the CAP, except for non-accompanying
measures for Objective 1 regions of the Structural Funds. For these regions, the source of funding
is the Guidance Section of the EAGGF. 
The budget for rural development within the Guarantee Section of the EAAGF is fixed at about 4.3
billion Euro per year for the seven-year period 2000-06 (Table A1.a). It is allocated across Member
States on an annual basis according to objective criteria that take account of specific needs,
especially those related to the environment, employment and countryside management (Table
A1.b). Most schemes include a national co-funding with the EU committed to paying a given
percentage of the project cost. The rate of co-financing varies in function of measures and is more
important for less favoured areas and Objective 1 regions.
(insert Table A1.a and Table A1.b)41
Table A1.a. CAP expenditure 2000-2006 (billion Euro, 1999 prices) (1)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Total CAP, of which 40.92 42.8 43.9 43.77 42.76 41.93 41.66 297.74
- markets (2) 36.62 38.48 39.57 39.43 38.41 37.57 37.29 267.37
- rural development (3)  4.3 4.32 4.33 4.34 4.35 4.36 4.37 30.37
Source: EC, 1999a, DGA Fac-Sheet on “CAP reform: Rural development.” (1) For calculating amounts at
current prices, a 2 % deflator will be used. (2) Including veterinary and phytosanitary measures and
excluding accompanying measures. (3) Including accompanying measures and rural development
initiatives outside Objective 1 programs previously funded by the EAGGF Guidance Section. 
Table A1.b. Support for rural development, 2000-2006, within the EAGGF Guarantee Section:
Financial allocation to Member States (indicative amounts in million Euro at 1999 prices and
percentages)                                                                                                           
Member States B DK D GR SP FR IRL I L NL A P FIN SW UK Total
Annual
average
50 46 700 131 459 760 315 595 12 55 423 200 290 149 154 4339
% 1.2 1.1 16.1 3 10.6 17.5 7.3 13.7 0.3 1.3 9.7 4.6 6.7 3.4 3.5 100
Source: EC, 1999a, DGA Fac-Sheet on “CAP reform: Rural development.”42
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